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THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN 
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE.* BY Homer Kripke. New York: Law and 
Business, Inc./Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1979. Pp. xxii, 368. $29. 
Over the last four decades, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and its staff have maintained a high level of technical compe-
tence, ability, enthusiasm, and integrity. Indeed, the SEC has long 
been regarded as an excellent training ground for young lawyers. In 
the last few years, however, the agency has drawn more frequent 
charges that it is inadequately fulfilling its statutory purpose of facil-
itating informed investment decisions. Professor Homer Kripke, a 
close observer of the financial markets for over forty-five years, has 
led the modern efforts to change basic SEC policies. 
Regarded by some as a maverick, Kripke has long argued that 
the present SEC-mandated disclosure does little to aid the investor 
in making financial choices. In this, his most recent book, the New 
York University scholar levels a broadside against the Commission's 
performance from legal, accounting, and economic perspectives. Al-
though he admires the ability of the Commission and its staff, the 
author argues that the Commission has failed to meet the challenge 
of the modern financial marketplace by disregarding the new eco-
nomic learning about how the securities markets really work. 
In Part I of his book, Kripke demonstrates that the SEC acts on 
the principle that disclosure is an unqualified blessing. This attitude, 
says Kripke, inhibits the agency from balancing disclosure's costs 
against its benefits in facilitating informed investment decisions. 
Professor Kripke paints the picture of an agency so enamored of its 
own procedures that it never evaluates them critically. He offers, as 
an example, the Commission's guidelines on disclosing perquisites. 
The agency acted, laments Kripke, without seriously considering 
whether such disclosure would really help a prospective investor. In-
stead, motivated by a sense of moral urgency, it imposed a broad 
rule without attending fo the essential issue of materiality: 
This has all been based on a handful of notorious cases, with no evi-
dence that significant amounts were involved in the majority of issuers 
or that stockholders would consider the disclosures material. When 
the novelty was fresh, the staff was apparently imposing cost allocation 
theories that would extract from many issuers disclosure of a phantom 
"perk" - an officer getting a benefit that costs the company little or 
nothing. Trifles like parking spaces were seriously discussed. Such 
ideological pursuit of details impairs the concept of materiality. These 
detailed prescriptions are not needed in instances of serious abuse, 
which the Commission is already handling under the antifraud laws 
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This "perk" hunt has left behind a residue of worthless, per-
functory "disclosures" that rarely reveal anything material . . . but 
add new burdens in the disclosure forms. [P. 19.] 
Since the Commission rarely assesses the relevance of its disclo-
sure requirements, Kripke is not surprised that disclosures contain 
little of value to an investor. In Part II, he argues that most of the 
information relevant to an investor's decision cannot be found in the 
statutorily-mandated prospectus and registration statement. Kripke 
maintains that the firm-oriented, historically objective information 
found in a prospectus inadequately aids an investor in assessing the 
general movement of the marketplace, the future prospects of the 
industry in which the firm competes, or even the individual firm's 
future economic health. 
Kripke feels that this results largely from the Commission's fail-
ure to adopt an interdisciplinary approach that embraces the new 
economic knowledge of how the financial markets work: 
Because it did not want to build, or did not know how to build, the 
competence to function in an economic environment, the SEC has 
functioned in an environment of dissociated law. A majority of its 
chairmen, commissioners, and principal staff members have been law-
yers. It has had a much smaller group of accountants and only a strag-
gling number of engineers, economists and other specialists. 
It is easier to apply verbal formulae to determine materiality than 
to develop a broad spectrum of skills for the task of defining material 
and useful disclosure. The Commission's fault is not failure to solve 
the problem of what is relevant. Its fault is not having tried. [P. 74.] 
Kripke points to economic studies indicating that movements in 
an individual security's price correlate with the market's movement, 
thus questioning the usefulness of the Commission's firm-oriented 
disclosure requirements. Further, the "efficient-markets hypothesis" 
contends that all mandatory disclosure is superfluous. Under this 
theory, the market rapidly and efficiently "impounds" all public in-
formation in the price of securities. If correct, this theory means 
"there is little likelihood that one can earn abnormal returns by fun-
damental analysis of securities through public information" (p. 309). 
The reader might reasonably ask how investors presently obtain 
needed information, if not through SEC-mandated documents. 
Kripke's answer is simple - through the market: 
A disclosure will be supplied voluntarily by issuers interested in the 
capital markets when there is a consensus among suppliers of capital or 
other transactors in the capital markets that this information is neces-
sary to them for lending and investment decisions. . . . If, on the other 
hand, it is material only under SEC conceptions, it will not be supplied 
unless SEC mandates its disclosure. [P. 119.] 
Kripke maintains that such information is adequate, even without an 
SEC mandate, because the market demands it: 
[T]he stock must have a following of interested investors and the spon-
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sorship of brokers and dealers making recommendations to institutions 
and individuals after being counseled themselves by financial analysts. 
Companies must furnish information deemed adequate by analysts 
... or lose their following .... Those whose results fall short of what 
they have given analysts and brokers reason to expect learn that "ana-
lysts do not like surprises". [Pp. 123-24.] , 
Kripke does not ask that the Commission automatically accept 
the teachings of the new economics of market analysis. He does ar-
gue, however, that rather it should recognize developments in nonle-
gal fields regarding the functioning of the markets and consider 
changes in its procedures that might respond to those developments. 
Somewhere between blind acceptance and blind rejection, there lies 
a happy medium. 
In Part III, Kripke "moves from the macroeconomic to the 
microeconomic." He argues that since financial statements are the 
heart of disclosure, and since these statements are presented in an 
accounting context, the Commission's biggest task should be to de-
fine accounting conceptually. Financial accounting in the modem 
world must serve the needs of the serious investor, and not merely 
report the management's stewardship of the funds entrusted to it by 
the owners of the business. Yet Kripke finds that the SEC has not 
sought to direct accounting toward this modem ideal, but has limited 
its concern to mere surface problems: 
[T]he Commission concerns itself with surface problems that can be 
forced into the mold of morality. It has not developed a capacity to 
probe beneath the surface of the hard problems - in the case of ac-
counting, the nature of the financial reality to be abstracted and the 
kind of reporting that will be useful for the investor. [P. 158.] 
Further, he argues, the Commission has abdicated its power to 
compensate for the accounting profession's natural inertia; it has al-
lowed the accountants themselves to formulate the Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles through the. Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. This delegation of power has perpetuated what 
Kripke considers an unconscionable tradition: the accountants' use 
of only historical cost in determining asset amounts for financial 
statements. He maintains that over time the historical cost figure, 
although objective, becomes irrelevant to investor decisions. Kripke 
would prefer a "fair value" system, ~eyed to an asset's replacement 
cost. "Fair value accounting . . . deals with the problem of prices 
moving at differential rates. Price level accounting deals with the 
problem of the change (usually the depreciation) in the unit of cur-
rency, and the resulting circumstances that costs incurred in different 
periods are not homogeneous" (p. 212). Kripke insists that both ad-
justments are necessary: "Fair value accounting shows price changes 
without separating the portion that is not a differential change but is 
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merely due to inflation. Price level accounting adjusts all assets 
alike, concealing differential shifts" (p. 213). 
In Part IV, the author attacks the Commission's narrowing of dis-
closure exemptions to section 5 of the Securities Act. As an example, 
he picks on rule 146's safe-harbor requirements for private place-
ments. He argues that the rule's complicated and uncertain require-
ments have encouraged issuers to make costly public o.ff erings rather 
than private placements of risky venture capital: 
Instead of encouraging securities placements to be private in risky ven-
ture capital situations, the SEC's attitude tends to push these very en-
terprises toward public offerings: the rigid requirements of Rule 146 
create the fear that the Commission will contend that the § 4(2) exemp-
tion is not available. The cost-saving of private placement as against a 
public registration has been severely reduced (if it exists at all) because 
of the agency's requirement that the information be the same as in a 
registration statement. . . . The private placee is disadvantaged if he 
wants to sell because he becomes subject to the resale limitations of 
Rule 144 ... while the ordinary purchaser in a public offering is free 
of these restrictions. Thus the balance of considerations steers the is-
suer toward a public offering and improvidently facilitates purchases 
by unsophisticated members of the public who would not have been 
invited to be private placees. [Pp. 240-41.] 
Part V concludes the book by suggesting that "the key to righting 
the agency's course is to commit determination of policy to persons 
with broad vision and the interdisciplinary capability contemplated 
when agencies like the SEC were created in the heyday of the New 
Deal" (p. 276). Kripke thinks the present commissioners have this 
ability, but are shackled by three groups of technicians: the public 
accountants, the SEC's examining and interpretative staff, and its en-
forcement staff. 
The public accountant, bemoans Kripke, has become a fourth 
party in "the trilateral disclosure system of issuer, investor and SEC" 
(p. 277). The author repeats his earlier arguments that the SEC, not 
the accounting profession, should determine accounting principles. 
The profession's influence should be cut back to areas where its 
financial sophistication would prove most valuable. For example, 
Kripke would value accountants' judgments on the inclusion of "soft ' 
information," such as projections of earnings and asset valuations in 
financial statements. But Krikpe doubts whether accountants will 
ever assume such a role until the SEC rids itself of its obsession with 
liability and discipline - an obsession that requires accountants to 
be policemen. 
The SEC's examining and interpretative staffs could also unchain 
the commissioners' abilities, according to Kripke, by becoming more 
receptive to the inclusion of estimates and valuations in the disclo-
sure documents: 
[The SEC's examining and interpretive staffs] support the tendencies of 
March 1980) SEC Regulation 823 
the public accountants toward objectivity and reliability and for siini-
lar reasons - not liability, but protection against cri(icism, by their 
own supervisors or by Congress and the public. They recognize that 
one cannot be criticized for permitting verifiable statements to be 
made; but one could be criticized for having let "soft" information be 
published, if it later proved to be inaccurate, no matter how reasonable 
it might have originally appeared to be. [P. 282.] 
Finally K.ripke prescribes that the SEC should curb its enforce-
ment staff. He attributes the current lack of meaningful disclosure 
largely to the staff's "infatuation with liability." This litigious at-
mosphere, he says, discourages innovation in disclosure devices. 
Further, the frequency of fraud does not justify the SEC's enforce-
ment orientation: 
I am not a Pollyanna who believes that there are no security frauds. 
There are plenty of them and -. be it noted - they were there in the 
heyday of enforcement, before the Supreme Court started limiting 
Rule lOb-5. The volume of situations calling for enforcement against 
fraud or serious nondisclosure has been substantial and it is not sug-
gested that the Commission's concern has not been justified. Yet those 
cases have been insignificant compared to the volume oflegitimate and 
proper disclosure consistent with what people understood was required 
of them. The Commission has been wrong in letting the needs of en-
forcement and the enforcement mentality color its dealings with the 
law-abiding sector of society. It has loaded disclosure for everyone, 
e.g., the notices of Rules 144 and 146, management compensation, and 
so on, in the hope of hampering a few abuses. Its creativeness has been 
almost entirely in the area of enforcement. [P. 284.] 
In the book's appendix, Kripke dismisses as a failure the report 
of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, which the SEC 
appointed in 1976 to evaluate the present disclosure system. The_ 
Committee ( of which the author was a member) failed because it 
ignored the possible impact of the new learning in the economics 
and accounting of the disclosure process. It did not rethink the fun-
damental premises and goals of the disclosure system. It thus 
shirked its principal mission. 
The SEC and Corporate .Disclosure poses a reasoned challenge to 
the fundamental concepts of the present system of corporate disclo-
sure. The author's sweeping recommendations _are sure to provoke 
lively criticism. For example, it may appear incongruous that 
Kripke should advocate greater SEC control over accounting princi-
ples, given his displeasure with the proliferation of SEC-mandated 
disclosure rules and procedures. K.ripke explains the apparent in-
consistency by arguing that, by wresting control of security disclo-
sure from technicians like the public accountant, the Commission 
could take a fresh approach to the meaning and purpose of disclo-
sure. But if the Commission has been narrow-minded in the past, 
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how can anyone guarantee that it will broaden its view in the future 
merely because the role of the technicians is changed? 
Any book that freshly analyzes a system long dominated by 
vested interests is bound to draw critical pot-shots. Fortunately, the 
criticism itself should stimulate reconsideration of the meaning of 
disclosure. As Professor K.ripke has been telling us for years, such a 
rethinking is badly needed. 
